Conspiracy Theory as a Specific Form of Total Ideology: Structural‑Functional Analysis

Abstract

The article explores the theoretical foundations of conspiracy theories as a unique form of total ideology. In an era often described as "post-ideology," where major political narratives are expected to wane, conspiracy theories not only persist but also evolve, competing with official knowledge institutions and mobilizing support outside state control. The study aims to verify or refute the hypothesis that conspiracy theory shares essential characteristics with total ideology through a comparative analysis of their structural elements and social functions. Methodologically, the research employs structural-functional analysis, drawing on the sociology of knowledge by Karl Mannheim, Antonio Gramsci's theory of hegemony, and Louis Althusser's concept of interpellation. The findings reveal that conspiracy theory mirrors total ideology in four key aspects: a binary worldview, the figure of an enemy, an explanatory framework resistant to falsification, and a bearer of true knowledge. Additionally, both serve similar social functions: integration, mobilization, and legitimation. Employing Robert Merton's functional analysis, the article demonstrates that conspiracy theory is not merely a functional equivalent of ideology but a distinct form. The authors argue that the specificity of conspiracy theory as an ideological form lies in its lack of institutional support. This deficit is compensated by epistemic closure, eschatological tension, and the sacralization of everyday life. This conceptualization allows us to understand conspiracy theory not as an aberration of individual thought but as a systemic social phenomenon. It generates and perpetuates collective meanings in the face of a crisis in the legitimacy of official institutions.