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How the media structure in Russia contributes to the state sport monopoly and concentrates the market of symbolical violence

HOW THE MEDIA STRUCTURE IN RUSSIA CONTRIBUTES TO THE STATE SPORT MONOPOLY AND CONCENTRATES THE MARKET OF SYMBOLICAL VIOLENCE

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Abstract:

The main assumption of this paper is that sport in Russia could not be regarded as a business or as part of the entertainment industry but solves first of all ideological problems – support of the national glory and patriotic education. From this point of view, it is interesting to see how the classic peace-making slogan of Pierre de Coubertin (sport is a peace) on which the Olympic movement is based, becomes increasingly less compatible with interstate competition and the glorification of particular nations inside this movement. To disclose the above thesis, we analysed industrial structures of Russian media and sport ownership in order to find similarities and correlations between the model the state uses to control and manage big media and the way it controls the field of sport. We discovered that similar models of the state financial control are used to control the sport industry via loyal oligarchs but mainly – through a couple of financial poles such as ‘Gazprom’ (main gas company in Russia).


Keywords: sport industry, Russia, media market, concentration, ownership

The central idea of this paper is to find correlations between the media and sport industry in Russia and to demonstrate how, using structural restrictions, the State manages the sport as a propagandist machine and uses it as a monopoly. At the superficial level, such connection could be found out in the public sphere, where during the past 5 years and especially after the Sochi Olympic Games, former state executives responsible for the Olympic Games, took the positions of chiefs of media companies. The most emblematic initiative was the nomination of the old chairman of the organising committee of the Sochi Olympic Games, Dmitry Chernyshenko, as the president of the most powerful media holdings in Russia – ‘Gazprom Media holdings’. Another case is the constant flow of ex sport figures into politics and their participation in the elaboration of the state policy in the field of media. Sometimes, such people plunge after such political career into the media business (this is the case of Alina Kabaeva, ex-champion in rhythmic gymnastics, deputy of State Duma, who is actually

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a chair of the board of the National Media Group). At the counter flow, we could observe how the people from the media industry are also injected into the sportive industry and more broadly – entertainment industry, which manages both the sport and media industries.


Theoretical review

Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer in 'Dialectics of the enlightenment' wrote that in a capitalist society, entertainment becomes a continuation of labour (Adorno & Horkheimer, 2002). It means that in the contemporary societies, cultural practice is directly linked with the consumer culture of the market capitalist economy, that leisure does not place a person outside such society but perfectly corresponds to it and contributes to its reproduction. For Althusser, sport is a part of the ideological apparatus and is used to reproduce ideologies such as 'individual competition, chauvinism, nationalism and sexism' (Althusser, 1977). Within such logics, sport is analysed by interactionist researchers: sport is a form of sublimation of risk situations (because there is a lack of such situations in the contemporary world), as well as the actions of sports fans constituting a form of ritualised struggle for territory (Marsh, Rosser & Harré, 1978).

Cultural studies tradition comes from an understanding of sport as a particular culture and correspondence of sport (and its different types) to different social classes. For example, Pierre Bourdieu in 'Critics of judgment of taste' points out that different habitus (everyday practices of people) form different class identities towards sport, which means different attitudes to embodied practices of sport (such as sport as a part of 'healthy life style', sport as exploitation of the body etc.) (Bourdieu, 1986).

A critical branch of cultural studies considered sport as a 'cultivation' of the main values of the capitalist world: division of labour, standardisation, bureaucratisation, quantification (quantified assessment) and homogenisation. Sport becomes a good sold on the market, which means that sport is an essence of the ideology of 'egoistic, competitively aggressive individualism which is based on myth of equality of possibilities but in reality representing the real class, power, sex and race inequality' (Hargreaves, 1982).

Thus, sport represents a part of the critical approach towards media and, consequently, we could use theoretical models of political economy of media and critics of cultural commodification to analyse it (Mosco, 2009; Smythe, 1981). Even early scholars of cultural studies traditions applied for research in the field of corporate press and media (Williams, 2001). Relatively recent works in this field from theoretical ascertaining comes to a serious structural interpretation of the media concentration phenomena. Such as excessive M&A deals in this field, which are speculatively enhancing the diagonal concentration and dependence of media from financial companies (Bouquillion, 2008). Such conglomerates are often bringing together sport teams and the video games sector. This allows us to use common



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approaches to study the concentration in the field of sport and its relationship with the media.

Russian model of media oligopoly

There are some peculiarities, which considerably influenced the Russian model of media property. From our point of view, this one did not change considerably since the 1990s even if some influential media owners and media monopolies have changed.

First of all, we should stress that even if the media were the first promoters of the liberal ideology of market reforms in the first Yeltsin period, the media was generally the first who refused to play according to the rules of the market. Already in 1993, the editors of the most widespread newspapers came personally to the president in order to demand financial aid as freezing the paper prices (Zassourski, 2004). Due to general financial problems, lack of state finance, macro-economic crises etc., the particular media system was established in the first half of the 1990s. Within this framework, the media was possible to exist only with sponsored moneys and not as a business. Neither advertising nor consumer moneys could be considered as revenues of the media. In this situation, the media mainly owned by editorial staff was confronted with the specific dilemma of either remaining dependent of a very narrow state budget (which was a case in regions where local authorities obtained control over media companies) or to find rich sponsors in the form of financial industrial corporations:

- First television channel (former – ORT) was partly privatised and the control over it was transferred to the consortium of banks headed by Boris Berezovsky, who obtained the control over ‘Nezavisimaya Gazeta’, ‘Kommersant’ and television channel ‘TV 6’
- Vladimir Potanin and ‘Onexim group’ were owners of newspaper ‘Izvestia’ and review ‘Expert’
- Vladimir Goussinsky and ‘Mostbank’ created a television channel NTV, newspaper ‘Segodnya’, obtained control over radio station ‘Echo Moskv’.


In certain regions, such media owners were large regional and federal oligarchic groups in the field of oil and gas (television company ‘Surgutinternovosti’ and ‘SurgutinformTV’, for example, in the Khanty Mansyisk district), in the field of energy etc. (Richter, 2008).

The second remark is linked with the first one. The mass media in such situation became a political tool in the hands of big oligarchs. Speaking in terms of Nicholas Garnham, they became a tool of ‘ideological plus value’ (Garnham, 1990). As a result and due to the big capital control over the media, Boris Yeltsin wins the presidential elections in 1996 despite the previous low rating of confidence (Zassourski, 2004). As a result, the media supporting the president during the elections obtained a set of preferences such as frequencies distributions (as NTV obtained a right to broadcast the entire day), credits from state companies (NTV obtained the credit from

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
Gazprombank, First channel – from Vneshekonombank). As a result, we could see the return of the old soviet tradition of ‘servicing journalism’, which works in favour of a narrow group of federal media owners, who in that period represented the real powers of the country (some of them were members of at least of two governments during Yeltsin’s second term).

Thus, the specific trajectory of the development of media economics in Russia as opposed to the central European countries (such as Poland or Hungary) was a ‘closed character of the media privatization’. In Central Europe, the post-soviet economic crisis led to the bankruptcy of media companies and their acquisition by big European media conglomerates (mainly German owned). In Russia, that process was different. Media ownership was redistributed a few times between big financial and industrial groups in order to extract rents from this property. As a result, in Central Europe, the media predominantly became a business and in Russia they became a tool of political influence. Such influence was also based on the sophisticated mechanism of self-censorship and reproduction of power relations at the micro-level (Koltsova, 2006).

Third peculiarity of the Russian media concentration model constitutes a significant reorientation of the media from print towards the audio-visual segment during the post-soviet times. In other words, during the 1990s the print periodical press was progressively losing its power and the television became the most powerful and influential media platform (Mickiewicz, 1999). This changed the configuration of the advertising market, whose volume started to grow during the 2000s due to a general growth of the Russian economy dependent from worldwide oil prices. As a result, the volume of television advertising revenues and the general volume of the television market was the main driver for media holdings, development in Russia; this is why Russian media holdings are mainly constructed around the television business.

The further development of Russian media capital was subordinate to this logic. The changes in oligarchic media property and progressive interception of this one by state-owned or state managed companies around the first half of 2000 was linked with changes of political elite groups. Thus, ‘Media Most’ controlled by the oligarch Gussinsky changed the owner after the opposition party supported by Gussinsky lost the elections and state monopoly ‘Gazprom’ obtained its assets. A group of companies controlled by opposition oligarch Boris Berezovski was partly destroyed (some media platforms were closed after some conflicts between minor co-owners, such as ‘Channel TV-6’) or partly sold to another oligarch, more loyal to the power after Berezovski’s exile in the UK. As a result, a share of 49% of the First channel was sold to two off-shore firms attributed to the loyal Russian oligarch and owner of the ‘Chelsea soccer team’ Roman Abramovich.

Some ‘old elite members’ from the 1990s displayed their media assets for sale in the second half of the 2000s. Thus, in 2007, Vladimir Potanin and his holdings ‘Profmedia’ sold the most powerful tabloid in Russia ‘Komsomolskaya Pravda’ to the energy company ESN, affiliated with the Russian railways state monopoly. Another political newspaper controlled by this oligarch, ‘Izvestia’, was transferred to the ‘National Media Group’ in 2010. A 25% share of the television holdings STS-media, controlled by



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another banker from the 1990s, Michail Fridman, was sold in 2013 to the same 'National Media Group'.

Thus, the reconfiguration of media ownership in the first decade of 2000 is subordinated to the same political logics and is linked with the replacement of elite groups: replacing the oligarchs who constituted the inner circle of the first president Boris Yeltsin and promoting new media owners close to the new president Vladimir Putin and his inner circle. This circle was formed by the president of the JSC 'Russian Railways' Vladimir Yakunin (this position in fall 2015), the president of the JSC 'Gazprom' (both companies are quasi state monopolies with a minority of private investors), Alexei Miller, the owner of the banking group 'Russia' Yuri Kovalchuk, president of 'Gazprom Invest Holdings' Alisher Usmanov.

Such oligarchic logics coincided with another trend in the second half of the 2000s. The raise in the oil rent and pumping of the state budget by its revenues caused a huge investment growth into the state media. Since mid-2000, the State created new state-owned media such as the television channel 'Zvezda' (belongs to the ministry of defence), international news agency 'Russia Today', television channel 'RT' broadcasting in three different languages, television channels 'Spas' (orthodox channel), news channel 'Vesti 24', 'Russia 2', scientific and education channel 'Nauka 2.0' etc.

Thus in mid-2000, the 3 models of media control were constituted (Degtereva & Kiriya, 2010):

- Direct state media ownership. In this case, media companies are state enterprises¹, they obtain a budget financing and their shares belong directly to the State Committee for Administration of the State Ownership. This is the case of 'Rossiskaya Gazeta' (the official publishing house of the Russian government), JSC 'Channel First' (51% shares are under control of the state) and VGTRK which is the largest state-owned television and radio broadcasting holding.
- Indirect media ownership through state-owned companies. In this case, the media are owned by state corporations which are organised under the form of JSC because could they contain some private stakeholders. This is the case of 'Gazprom media' (owned by Gazprombank), some media assets of JSC 'Russian Railroads' (such as the biggest tabloid 'Komsomolskaya Pravda').
- Indirect media ownership through the non-formal relationship of oligarchs with the state administration. If we are only considering the political media, they are in fact predominantly controlled by just two-three individuals: Yuri Kovalchuk (close friend of the president since his administrative career began in Saint Petersburg in the early 1990s), Alisher Usmanov (related to the president through his wife – the chief coach of the Russian team of rhythmic gymnastics), Michail Prokhorov (the oligarch who presented the presidential elections in 2012).


We should stress that the state mainly controlled the political media in this manner, or in other words television channels and newspapers (mainly 'Izvestia', which was the

¹ In Russian legislation "state owned enterprises" is a particular legal form of registered enterprises

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


oldest political newspaper since the beginning of communist times, ‘Komsomolskaya Pravda’ and ‘Kommersant’), which are covering the political life and social events. Entertainment media and in particular the press (such as glossy magazines etc.) are less subordinated to the political control from the state and in this field, the share of foreign ownership is much higher (at least one half of the publishing houses among the first ten publishers are foreign companies).

In order to analyse the concept of media ownership, it is insufficient to solely understand the concentration of holdings. We need to know the financial flows, such as liabilities and other forms of financial dependence, which are behind any holdings. Thus, Philippe Bouquillion proposes to separate the notion of ‘owners’, or in other words the holders of shares, and financial poles – final beneficiary (Bouquillion, 2008).

Table 1. (Part 1) Evolution of ownership in private and semi-state media

Media	1998		2015		Industrial activity of the pole
	Owner	Financial Pole	Owner	Financial Pole	
‘Izvestia’ newspaper	Profmedia	Oneximbank	National media group	Bank «Russia», IC «Sogaz», JSC «Gazprom»	Energy
«Komsomolskaya pravda» newspaper			ESN Group	JSC «Russian Railways»	Transport
Pervy Kanal	Boris Berezovsky	Objedinenny Bank	National media group	Bank «Russia», IC «Sogaz», JSC «Gazprom»	Energy
TV6			ORT KB LTD	Roman Abramovich	Energy
Publishing house «Kommersant»			Closed		Alisher Usmanov
TV Channel NTV	Vladimir Goussinski	Mostbank	Gazprom media	Gazprombank, JSC Gazprom	Energy, Finance
PH «Sem Dnej»					
Radio «Echo Moskvy»					
TV Channel TNT					
NTV+ satellite platform	Irena Lesnevskaya	JSC RAO EES	National media group	Bank «Russia», IC «Sogaz», JSC «Gazprom»	Energy
TV channel Ren-TV					
Channel Five	Government of Saint Petersburg		National media group	Bank «Russia», IC «Sogaz», JSC «Gazprom»	Energy



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Muz-TV	Igor Krutoj		UTV	Alisher Usmanov, Ivan Tavrinn, Gazprominvestholdings Ltd, JSC Gazprom	Energy
7 TV After 2012 – Disney Channel	Moscow Government	Moscow Government			
CTC Channel	CTC-Media	Peter Gerwy	National media group (25%) Alisher Usmanov (75%)	Bank «Russia», IC «Sogaz», JSC «Gazprom» Gazprominvestholdings Ltd, JSC Gazprom	Energy
DTV Channel – after 2011 Petertz	Natalia Darialova		UTV (75%)	Alisher Usmanov, Ivan Tavrinn, Gazprominvestholdings Ltd, JSC Gazprom	Energy

Table 1. (Part 2) Evolution of ownership in private and semi-state media

If we take a look at **Table 1**, we can see that today quasi all political media are under the control of the financial pole – ‘Gazprom’ and the segment of energy.

So if in 1998, the main owners of media assets were private individuals and investors, who were in parallel financial and industrial corporation owners, right now this is much more the case of companies, corporations and holdings. These are strongly linked with state owned companies as financial poles.

Since 2010, the integration of media business with the assets of digital networks (first of all social media) has been conducted. In 2010, Alisher Usmanov became one of the stakeholders of Digital Sky Technologies and the owner of the biggest internet-holding, the Mail.Ru Group. Until 2014 Mail.Ru would completely concentrate as assets such as ‘Odnoklassniki’ and ‘VKontakte’ (most popular social networks in RuNet), would buy ICQ from AOL, the shares within Facebook and Apple (such assets were sold by Usmanov in 2014) (Kiriya, 2012).


The consolidation of international relations and of the general isolationist policy since 2014 considerably influenced the Russian model of media concentration. On the wave of anti-western sanctions (and patriotic orientation after the Sochi 2014 Olympic Games), the Russian parliament voted a law on restricting the foreign capital in mass-media to 20% (before it was 50%). This led to the sale of foreign stakeholders’ shares in media holdings. Before the end of 2015, 39% of the CTC-Media shares, owned by the Swedish MTG were sold to Alisher Usmanov. His holdings also plan to concentrate 36% of the shares traded in free flow on NYSE. Thus, all the market of open access generalist channels will be under the control of a single financial pole, ‘Gazprom’, which illustrates the contemporary raw material based economy of Russia.

The large publishers of periodical press (mainly represented by western companies) started to leave the Russian market following the promulgation of this law. Switzerland based Edipress sold out their business to the management in Russia. The deal on the

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biggest holdings ‘Sanoma Independent Media’ was suspended by Roskomnadzor, the Russian media watchdog. Publishing house ‘Axel Springer Russia’ was sold to Artcom Media Group (advertising media holdings).

Some of the media owners and their assets became restricted in their operations abroad due to western sanctions against Russia, including financial operations, borrowings etc. Yuri Kovalchuk and his ‘National Media Group’ is present in one of such sanctions list. Awaiting some sanctions another close associate to the president, oligarch Alisher Usmanov, sold his shares in Facebook and Apple in 2014. The whole structure of the Russian media corporate ownership is presented in *Figure 1*.





Figure 1. (Part 1) The structure of industrial and corporate ownership of the Russian political and business media



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Figure 1. (Part 2) The structure of industrial and corporate ownership of the Russian political and business media

Media conglomerates and sport in Russia

In order to trace the connection of the media ownership and key interests in the field of sport in Russia, we drew a map of the sport industrial space connected with the main media. We took the key owners of big soccer clubs within the Russian prime-league and drafted the list of the main television channels (since the actual model of media holding in Russia is very centred on the television, which remains the main source of information for the majority of Russians) and telecommunication conglomerates, which are controlled by the same owners. Then, additional interests in field of sport were added to these findings (general sponsorship of sportive teams, connections with sportive federations etc.). As a result we drew **Table 2**.

Table 2. (Part 1) Owners of the largest soccer clubs and their connections with media owners

	<u>Television channels</u>	<u>Telecommunications</u>	<u>Soccer club</u>	<u>Interests in others fields of sport</u>
Government of the Republic of Mordovia			Mordovia	
Administration of Samara region	Samara regional television		Krylia Sovetov	
JSC «Uralchim»			Amkar	Swimming Boxing

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



Table 2. (Part 2) Owners of the largest soccer clubs and their connections with media owners

	<u>Television channels</u>	<u>Telecommunications</u>	<u>Soccer club</u>	<u>Interests in others fields of sport</u>
Administration of the Rostov region	Don-TR		Rostov	
Administration of Krasnodar region Oleg Mkrтчan	Kuban 24		Kuban	
Government of Chechen Republic	Grozny		Terek	
Government of Sverdlovsk region	Regional television (OTB) (50%)		Ural	
Suleiman Kerimov	-	Rostelecom	Anzhi	Graeco-Roman wrestling
Alisher Usmanov	UTV	Megafon	Arsenal (23%)	Fencing
Gazprom	NTV TNT Match TV	NTV+	Zenit Schalke	Hockey Biathlon Athletics
Taif oil company Government of Tatarstan Republic	Tatmedia TNV-Novy vek		Rubin	
RZD		Transtel ecom	Lokomotiv	
VTB			Dinamo	Volley-Ball Hockey Rhythmic gymnastics
Sergey Galitski			Krasnodar	
Yevgeni Ginner (75%) Ministry of defence (25%)	Zvezda		CSKA	
Michail Prokhorov	RBC			Basketball Biathlon



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Table 2. (Part 3) Owners of the largest soccer clubs and their connections with media owners

	<u>Television channels</u>	<u>Telecommunications</u>	<u>Soccer club</u>	<u>Interests in others fields of sport</u>
Leonid Fedun (Oil company Lukoil)			Spartak	Cross country skiing Valley-Ball
Renova		Akado		Soccer
Sogaz insurance company	Pervy channel (25%) Five channel Ren TV CTC-Media (25%)			Hockey
Vladimir Potanin	TV3 (before 2014) 2x2 (before 2014) Pyatnitsa (before 2014)*			Hockey

We could observe some clear similarities between the concentration on the sport field and media. Firstly, as in media, we could observe the tight intersection of interests between the field of sport and the telecommunications industry. So, if for mass-media, the telecommunication market represents a continuation of the distribution chain, for the sport industry this is also the case. This could be considered as the control over such business stage and as the distribution of broadcasting rights.


Secondly, we should stress that a significant portion of soccer clubs as in the media field are owned by governments of regions, therefore by the State. In the field of media, as we know, the State controls such assets, with a share of 51% in 'Channel One', full holdings of VGTRK, publishing house 'Rossijskaya Gazeta', information agencies 'Russia Today' and Itar Tass, television channel 'Zvezda' and so on and this is without a lot of regional television channels (which we could see in the table above). From this perspective, Russian sport and media is not a business in the strong sense of this term and needs permanent subventions (from the State or private owners).

As well as in field of media, we could observe the double ownership of sport clubs when the State holds the sportive club jointly with a big financial/industrial corporation. This is the case of the Tatarstan republic, where the soccer club 'Rubin' is partly controlled by the regional oil holdings 'Taif' and partly – by the government of the region, of the regional of Krasnodar (soccer club 'Kuban' is partly owned by the administration of the region and partly – by the entrepreneur Oleg Mkrchan, the owner of the 'Russian mining-steel company'). In some

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


regions (as well as in the Chechen Republic) soccer clubs are completely owned by the regional governments which does not necessarily mean that they could not have general sponsorship from industrial and financial companies. For example, soccer club 'Ural' belongs to the regional government and the general sponsorship of this club is covered by the group 'Renova'.

Another common thing between media ownership and sport soccer club ownership is the typology of the control. In this context, we could also find the same model of state control in this field: via the state owned company (this type of control prevails actually), directly via the State budget (including the budget of regions) and, finally, via the private owners close to the power. Two main media owners in Russia (close friends of the Russian president Putin, Yuri Kovalchuk and Alisher Usmanov, both affiliated with financial pole 'Gazprom'), as we could see, are very lowly present in the capital of the soccer clubs in Russia. Kovalchuk and his insurance company 'Sogaz' are only involved in the sponsorship of hockey clubs (but not direct ownership). Alisher Usmanov is the president of the International Federation of fencing and owns 27% of the London based club 'Arsenal' (but has no shares in Russian soccer clubs). Let us now refer to the interests of media and telecommunication owners in the construction of the Olympic infrastructure and stadiums for the World Cup in 2018. We should first of all stress that the funds for such construction have been generally provided by the state. But the receivers of such construction funds have been either regional governments or state companies or even privately owned companies. The largest of them such as JSC 'Russian Railways' or 'Gazprom' have been additionally capitalised by the state. Among the receivers we could find private business companies such as the Onexsim Group controlled by V. Potanin, which obtained the funds for the construction of the ski resort 'Rosa Khutor' for the Olympic Games 2014 in Sochi. The full list of companies involved in the construction of Sochi 2014 and WC 2018 facilities is mentioned in **Table 3**.

Table 3. (Part 1) Connections between media, and telecom owners and contractors for the construction of the Olympic and WC 2018 infrastructure

	<u>TV channels</u>	<u>Telecommunications</u>	<u>Building of objects for Sochi 2014 Games</u>	<u>Building objects for WC 2018</u>
Administration of the Rostov region	Don-TR			Yes
Administration of the Krasnodar region	Kuban 24		Yes	Yes
Administration of the Samara region	Samara regional television			Yes
Government of the Mordovia Republic				Yes



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Table 3. (Part 2) Connections between media, and telecom owners and contractors for the construction of the Olympic and WC 2018 infrastructure


	<u>TV channels</u>	<u>Telecommunications</u>	<u>Building of objects for Sochi 2014 Games</u>	<u>Building objects for WC 2018</u>
Government of the Sverdlovsk region	Oblastnoe televidenie (50%)			Yes
Alisher Usmanov	UTV	Megafon	Yes	
Gazprom	NTV TNT Match TV	NTV+	Yes	Yes
Taif	Tatmedia TNV-Novy vek			Yes
VTB				Yes
Leonid Fedun (Lukoil)				Yes
Serguey Galitsky				Yes
JSC «RZD»		Transtelecom	Yes	
Michail Prokhorov	RBC			
Renova		Akado	Yes	Yes
Sogaz	Channel One (25%) Fifth channel Ren-TV CTC-Media (25%)			
Vladimir Potanin	TV 3 (until 2014) 2x2 (until 2014) Piatnitsa (until 2014)		Yes	

On the basis of this table we could draw some conclusions. First of all, the majority of regional administrations owning soccer clubs obtained the right to host the World Cup matches and, consequently, budget funds for the construction of stadiums. Then, such funds could be distributed among privately owned contractors (industrial group 'Sinara' builds stadiums in Ekaterinburg and Volgograd, financial structures of Guennady Timchenko for the moneys

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obtained from 'Gazprom' and federal budgets are constructing the stadium 'Zenit-Arena' in Saint-Petersburg).

Secondly, we could see that the universal investor in Russian sport (as well as in sport clubs and the Olympic infrastructure) is the JSC 'Gazprom'. Seemingly, this is why some investors dependent from these financial pole actors (such as Kovalchuk and Usmanov) are less involved in sport financing.

Discussion and conclusion

To conclude this paper, we should first of all stress that the model of sport and media concentration in Russia is in fact on the stage of diagonal concentration, as it has been the case in the 1990s in the world media economy. During this time, media companies preferred to concentrate their assets and merge them with sport companies. Companies such as the News Corporation of Rupert Murdoch in the UK, Canal + in France etc. became the owners of soccer clubs (respectively Manchester United and Paris Saint Germain). But in the first dozen years of the third millennium during the growing diversification of media assets, big media conglomerates started to split out. After this period in the western world, media conglomerates preferred to narrow their businesses and sold their sport assets. So the era of big sport owners collecting soccer clubs began.

In Russia, as we could see, the financial and industrial sector linked sport as well as the media with the existing state controls. From this point of view, in further works the analysis of the global sportive media ownerships seems to be appropriate.

In fact, we should also point out the participation of Russian media players in the creation and activities of the monopolistic company, which possesses the exclusive right to produce and broadcast the high definition signal from any big sport events. So the 'Channel One' (51% are state owned, 25% are owned by Yuri Kovalchuk and his structures), VGTRK state owned holdings, RIA Novosti (completely state owned) and NTV Plus satellite platform (owned by 'Gazprom') created in 2009 the non-commercial company 'Sportive broadcasting' in charge of such production. Thus, the broadcasting rights, which are freely exchanged in the foreign broadcasting market in Russia, became the object of sponsorship from the State corporations, which in their terms are main recipients of such rights. This case illustrates the fact that the State, by owning and financing sports, makes this field a part of the ideological apparatus as well as the media.


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
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КАК МЕДИАСТРУКТУРА РОССИИ ПОДДЕРЖИВАЕТ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННУЮ МОНОПОЛИЮ НА СПОРТ И УСИЛИВАЕТ РЫНОК СИМВОЛИЧЕСКОЙ ЖЕСТОКОСТИ

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Аннотация:

Главный тезис этой статьи состоит в том, что спорт в России не может быть рассмотрен в качестве бизнеса или части развлекательной индустрии, взамен этого является инструментом для решения идеологических проблем, поддержания государственной славы и патриотического воспитания. В этом контексте интересно, как альтруистический слоган "Спорт - это мир", используемый для Олимпийского движения и Олимпийских игр, становится все менее и менее сравним с соревнованиями между странами и восславлением отдельных наций в рамках этого движения. Для раскрытия этого соображения был проведен анализ собственников медиа и спортивных институтов в России с целью найти сходства и корреляции в том, как государство использует крупные средства массовой информации и том, как оно контролирует спортивную сферу. Доказывается, что используются схожие модели.

Ключевые слова: спортивная индустрия, Россия, медиарынок, концентрация, собственность

БИБЛИОГРАФИЯ


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